title: "5G Network Slicing Security" description: "TelcoSec 5G network slicing security risks in Standalone architecture — cross-slice isolation failures, shared NF abuse, RAN starvation, and Kubernetes threats." date: "2024-05-12" lastModified: "2026-05-15" author: "Ghost_Baseband" authorName: "TelcoSec Research" category: "CELLULAR_NETWORKS_ATTACKS" severity: "CRITICAL" image: "/images/articles/network-slicing-hero.webp" imageAlt: "5G Network Slicing Strategy - Isolated Logical Networks for eMBB, URLLC, and mMTC" readingTime: 22

Network Slicing is the defining feature of the 5G Standalone (SA) architecture. By leveraging Cloud-Native principles, Software-Defined Networking (SDN), and Network Functions Virtualization (NFV), operators can run multiple distinct logical networks over a single shared physical infrastructure. While this provides unprecedented flexibility for diverse enterprise use cases — from autonomous vehicles requiring sub-millisecond latency to massive IoT sensor networks requiring millions of concurrent connections — it introduces fundamental cross-tenant isolation and shared-resource security challenges that do not exist in legacy cellular architectures.

The commercial promise of network slicing is enormous: operators can monetize their infrastructure by selling customized, SLA-backed virtual networks to enterprise customers. But the security promise — "isolated logical networks" — masks deep technical complexities. A compromised device in a low-security IoT slice can potentially cascade failures into a critical URLLC slice running autonomous vehicle controls, unless strict multi-plane isolation is enforced at every layer of the stack. This article provides a comprehensive threat analysis of those failure modes and the defensive controls required to prevent them.

For the foundational 5G SBA architecture that underpins network slicing, and the broader 5G network security architecture including SUCI and 5G-AKA, see our dedicated research articles.

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This research analyzes the threat model of 5G Network Slicing. We evaluate the effectiveness of inter-slice isolation across the Radio Access Network (RAN), Transport, and Core security domains, demonstrating how resource exhaustion or misconfiguration in one slice can compromise the availability and confidentiality of adjacent dedicated slices.

KEY TAKEAWAYS:

Shared Network Functions (NSSF, AMF) are critical single points of failure.
Inter-slice attacks leverage shared underlying virtualization platforms (K8s).
RAN resource allocation is vulnerable to cross-slice starvation attacks.
NSSAI spoofing provides unauthenticated access to target slice NFs.
Defense requires enforcement at RAN, Core, and Infrastructure layers simultaneously.

I. The Anatomy of a Network Slice

A network slice is an end-to-end logical network tailored for specific performance requirements. According to 3GPP TS 23.501, slices consist of three architectural layers that must each be independently secured:

Slice-Specific NFs: Network Functions dedicated entirely to one slice (e.g., a dedicated SMF and UPF for an enterprise IoT network). These provide the strongest isolation but at higher cost.
Shared NFs: Control plane functions that serve multiple slices simultaneously (e.g., the AMF, NSSF, and NRF). These are the primary cross-slice attack surface, as detailed in our SBA vulnerability analysis.
Shared Infrastructure: The underlying compute hardware, hypervisor/container orchestration (Kubernetes), transport network, and Radio Access Network (gNodeB) physically shared by all slices.

Slices are identified by the Single Network Slice Selection Assistance Information (S-NSSAI), which comprises a Slice/Service Type (SST) and a Slice Differentiator (SD). The SST defines the expected behavior (eMBB, URLLC, MIoT), while the SD allows multiple slices of the same type to coexist.

Standard Slice Types

SST: 1 (eMBB) Enhanced Mobile Broadband. High bandwidth for smartphones and video streaming. Standard security profile. Typical SLA: 100+ Mbps DL, 99.9% availability.

SST: 2 (URLLC) Ultra-Reliable Low Latency. Autonomous driving, industrial automation, remote surgery. Highest availability and security requirements. Typical SLA: <1ms latency, 99.9999% availability.

SST: 3 (MIoT) Massive IoT. Smart city sensors, metering, environmental monitoring. Low bandwidth per device, massive connection density. Typical SLA: 1M+ devices/km², low security profile per device.

Slice Isolation Responsibility Matrix

Component	Isolation Mechanism	Responsibility	Risk Level
RAN (gNodeB)	PRB reservation (Hard/Soft slicing)	MNO	High — shared spectrum
Transport	VLAN/VxLAN/MPLS segmentation	MNO	Medium — well-understood controls
AMF (shared)	Logical separation, rate limiting	MNO	Critical — single point of failure
NSSF	Slice selection policy enforcement	MNO	Critical — routing decisions
SMF/UPF (dedicated)	Per-slice instances	MNO + Enterprise	Low — strongest isolation
Kubernetes	Namespaces, NetworkPolicy, PodAntiAffinity	MNO	High — container escape risk
Application	Enterprise-managed security	Enterprise	Variable — enterprise responsibility

DIAGRAM::5G NETWORK SLICING ISOLATION

The Isolation Paradox

Operators sell slices as "isolated logical networks," but physics dictates that they must share the same physical RF spectrum, fiber backhaul, and data center host machines. True absolute isolation is mathematically impossible in a shared infrastructure. The security question is not "are slices isolated?" but "how strong is the isolation, and what are the failure modes?"

II. Cross-Slice Attack Vectors

Security isolation models fail when attackers exploit the shared resources that bridge the logical boundaries between slices. The attack surface spans three distinct planes — and a comprehensive attack may chain vectors across all three simultaneously.

1. Shared Network Function (NF) Exploitation

The Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) and Network Slice Selection Function (NSSF) must interact with all User Equipment (UE) before they are assigned to a specific slice. If a massive IoT botnet in one slice launches a signaling storm (e.g., millions of simultaneous Registration Requests), the shared AMF processing capacity is exhausted.

Consequently, critical UEs (like autonomous vehicles) attempting to connect to the URLLC slice will be dropped because the AMF cannot process their initial signaling requests. The malicious slice has effectively caused a Denial of Service against the clean, isolated slice — without ever touching the URLLC slice's dedicated NFs.

This attack is amplified when the 5G SBA vulnerabilities shared NRF is also overwhelmed, preventing legitimate NF discovery for critical slices. The cascading failure pattern is: IoT botnet → AMF exhaustion → NRF overload → URLLC slice attachment failure.

2. Infrastructure-Layer Lateral Movement

5G core functions run as Containerized Network Functions (CNFs) orchestrated by Kubernetes. If varying slice NFs are scheduled on the same worker node to optimize hardware utilization, container escape vulnerabilities can instantly bridge the slice boundary.

<CodeBlock language="yaml" filename="unsafe-pod-scheduling.yaml" code="apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: upf-iot-slice labels: slice: mIoT spec: containers:

name: upf image: vendor/upf:latest securityContext: privileged: true # DANGEROUS: Common in telco for DPDK access
No resource limits → can starve adjacent pods
No readOnlyRootFilesystem → writable container for persistence

Missing: nodeSelector, podAntiAffinity

Result: K8s scheduler may place on same node as URLLC UPF">

An attacker compromising a vulnerability in the upf-iot-slice (perhaps exposed due to less stringent security controls on the vast number of low-power IoT devices) could leverage that privileged container to access the host kernel, bypassing all 3GPP network-level isolation and reading memory from adjacent upf-urllc-slice containers. The CVE-2024-21626 runc vulnerability demonstrated exactly this class of container escape in production Kubernetes environments.

3. RAN Resource Starvation

In the Radio Access Network (gNodeB), physical resources must be dynamically allocated. If the gNodeB fails to enforce strict PRB reservations (Hard Slicing) and relies on statistical multiplexing (Soft Slicing), an adversary can force UEs in one slice to generate massive interference or demand maximum throughput, starving adjacent slices of radio resources before the MAC scheduler can react.

The distinction between Hard and Soft slicing is critical:

Approach	PRB Allocation	Cross-Slice Impact	Spectrum Efficiency	Cost
Hard Slicing	Fixed per-slice reservation	None (guaranteed isolation)	Lower (reserved capacity may be idle)	Higher
Soft Slicing	Dynamic/statistical sharing	Vulnerable to starvation	Higher (shared pool)	Lower
Hybrid	Guaranteed minimum + shared pool	Limited (minimum guaranteed)	Balanced	Medium

RED TEAM INSIGHT

SLICE RESOURCE CONTENTION ATTACK

An adversary does not need to compromise the target slice's encryption to degrade its performance. By launching a high-throughput, low-entropy data stream within a low-priority eMBB slice that shares the same Physical Resource Blocks (PRBs) as a critical URLLC slice, the attacker can force the gNodeB's MAC scheduler into a contention state. If the gNodeB is configured for "Soft Slicing," the resulting jitter and packet loss can be sufficient to trigger safety fail-safes in autonomous vehicle slices.

4. Transport Network Bridging

The transport network connecting RAN to Core uses segmentation technologies (VLAN, VxLAN, MPLS) to isolate slice traffic. However, SDN controller compromise or misconfigured segment routing can bridge these boundaries. An attacker with access to the SDN controller can reprogram flow rules to redirect traffic between slices — or mirror sensitive URLLC traffic to a monitoring point in the eMBB slice.

III. Slice Selection and Routing Bypass

The routing of unauthenticated signaling traffic to specific slices presents an inherent vulnerability window that is fundamental to the 3GPP architecture.

During the initial Registration Request, the UE includes the Requested NSSAI in the clear (before NAS encryption is established). The initial AMF uses this NSSAI to route the request to the correct slice-specific AMF via the NSSF. This is a design requirement — the network cannot encrypt what it doesn't yet know how to route.

An attacker controlling a rogue UE (or a compromised IMSI catchers) can falsify the Requested NSSAI. While the network will eventually reject the attachment when the UE fails secondary authentication (Primary Authentication/EAP-AKA' or NSSAA), the initial AMF and target slice AMF must process the signaling, perform database queries to the UDM, and allocate temporary memory state. This provides a direct, unauthenticated vector to inject malformed payloads directly into the NFs of an unauthorized, highly secure slice.

<CodeBlock language="text" is-terminal code=" # NSSAI Spoofing Attack Flow:

Rogue UE sends Registration Request with NSSAI={SST:2, SD:enterprise_urllc}
Initial AMF forwards to NSSF for slice routing
NSSF returns target AMF for URLLC slice
URLLC AMF processes the Registration Request → allocates UE context
UDM/AUSF runs Primary Authentication → fails (invalid credentials)
BUT: URLLC AMF already parsed attacker-controlled NAS payload
Result: Attack surface exposed BEFORE authentication completes

Amplification: Send from 10,000 rogue UEs → URLLC AMF resource exhaustion">

Unauthenticated Signaling Exposure

Because NSSAI headers determine routing before cryptographic authentication is complete, any attacker can force the highly-secure NFs of a critical slice to parse untrusted, attacker-controlled ASN.1 or JSON payloads. This is a fundamental architectural exposure in the 3GPP design — not a misconfiguration.

IV. Implementing Reliable Slice Isolation

Protecting a sliced network architecture requires moving beyond standard IT zero-trust and implementing strict boundary enforcement across three planes. The controls must be layered — failure at any single plane should not result in complete isolation breach.

01 Hardware Anti-Affinity Rules

Implement strict Kubernetes podAntiAffinity rules and NodeSelector taints to guarantee that critical slice NFs (like URLLC UPFs) explicitly never share the same bare-metal host machine or hypervisor as lower-security slice NFs. This prevents container escape attacks from bridging slice boundaries.

02 Strict Resource Quotas

Apply rigorous rate-limiting and signaling quotas at the Service Communication Proxy (SCP) and shared AMFs. If one slice begins generating 500% of its baseline traffic, the SCP must throttle that traffic before shared CPU cycles are depleted for other slices. Configure Kubernetes ResourceQuotas and LimitRanges per-namespace.

03 Slice-Specific Authentication (NSSAA)

Implement Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization (NSSAA), enabling enterprise customers managing a slice to execute their own secondary EAP-TLS authentication loop, independent of the operator's primary UDM/AUSF authentication. This ensures that even if primary authentication is compromised, the enterprise slice remains protected.

04 Hard Slicing in the RAN

Ensure the gNodeB operates in a Hard Slicing configuration for critical URLLC communication, permanently reserving a portion of PRBs exclusively for that slice, preventing MAC-layer starvation from generic eMBB traffic bursts. The cost of reserved-but-idle spectrum is the insurance premium for guaranteed availability.

Kubernetes Hardening for Slice Isolation

hardened-urllc-deployment.yaml

        apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: upf-urllc
namespace: slice-urllc  # Dedicated namespace per slice
spec:
template:
 spec:
   nodeSelector:
     slice-tier: urllc-dedicated  # Pinned to dedicated hardware
   affinity:
     podAntiAffinity:
       requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
       - labelSelector:
           matchExpressions:
           - key: slice
             operator: NotIn
             values: ['urllc']
         topologyKey: kubernetes.io/hostname
   containers:
   - name: upf
     securityContext:
       privileged: false
       readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
       runAsNonRoot: true
       capabilities:
         drop: ['ALL']
         add: ['NET_ADMIN']  # Minimum for UPF packet processing
     resources:
       limits:
         cpu: '4'
         memory: 8Gi
       requests:
         cpu: '2'
         memory: 4Gi

Defense Effectiveness by Attack Vector

Control	AMF Exhaustion	Container Escape	RAN Starvation	NSSAI Spoofing	Transport Bridging
Hardware Anti-Affinity	N/A	Excellent	N/A	N/A	N/A
Resource Quotas (SCP)	Excellent	N/A	N/A	Good	N/A
NSSAA	Partial	N/A	N/A	Excellent	N/A
Hard RAN Slicing	N/A	N/A	Excellent	N/A	N/A
NetworkPolicy (K8s)	N/A	Good	N/A	N/A	N/A
SDN Access Control	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Excellent

RED TEAM INSIGHT

UNAUTHENTICATED SIGNALING ATTACK SURFACE

The fact that NSSF routing decisions are based on unauthenticated NSSAI values creates a permanent "Window of Vulnerability." An attacker can send malformed JSON payloads targeting the slice-specific AMF logic before any cryptographic challenge has occurred. This effectively makes the 5G slice-specific control plane as exposed as a public-facing web server, requiring significantly more robust input validation than legacy monolithic telecom nodes.

IV. The Multi-Tenant Core: Kubernetes Isolation Failure Models

The 5G Service Based Architecture (SBA) is, at its heart, a massive multi-tenant Kubernetes cluster. In a sliced network, different namespaces are used to isolate the Network Functions of different slices. However, the shared Linux kernel remains the single point of failure.

A. The Kernel Boundary Breach

When multiple slices run NFs on the same physical worker node, they share the host's kernel. Vulnerabilities such as Dirty Pipe (CVE-2022-0847) or runc breakouts allow an attacker who has compromised a container in a low-security slice (e.g., a massive IoT slice with millions of potentially insecure devices) to gain root access to the host machine.

Once the host kernel is compromised, the logical isolation provided by 3GPP vanishes. The attacker can:

Read Memory Across Namespaces: Access the cryptographic keys or subscriber data belonging to a high-security URLLC or government slice running on the same node.
Manipulate User Plane Traffic: Inject or modify packets in the UPF of an adjacent slice by directly interacting with the host's network interfaces or DPDK buffers.
Persistence via Host Rootkits: Install persistent backdoors in the telecom infrastructure that survive container restarts and NF upgrades.

B. Side-Channel Leakage in Sliced Infrastructure

Even without a direct exploit, "noisy neighbor" effects can leak sensitive information between slices. By measuring memory latency or cache timing on a shared CPU, a malicious NF can potentially reconstruct the cryptographic operations occurring in a neighboring slice. In the context of 5G, where slices may handle sensitive industrial or government data, these side-channel attacks represent a sophisticated threat vector that traditional telecom monitoring tools are ill-equipped to detect.

DEFENSE STRATEGY

INFRASTRUCTURE ISOLATION HARDENING

To prevent kernel-level isolation breaches, operators must implement: - **Runtime Security Monitoring:** Use eBPF-based tools (like Cilium Tetragon or Falco) to detect anomalous kernel calls and unexpected file access in real-time. - **Hardware-Assisted Isolation:** Leverage Intel SGX or AMD SEV to create TEEs (Trusted Execution Environments) for sensitive Network Functions like the AUSF and UDM. - **Zero-Trust NetworkPolicies:** Enforce "deny-all" by default between namespaces, only allowing explicitly whitelisted HTTP/2 traffic between authorized NFs via a service mesh like Istio.

V. Slice SLA Poisoning: Strategic Resource Exhaustion

In a sliced environment, security is not just about confidentiality; it is about the guaranteed availability defined in the Service Level Agreement (SLA). "SLA Poisoning" is a new class of attack where an adversary systematically degrades the performance of a target slice below its contractual threshold.

A. Strategic Signaling Saturation

By carefully timing Registration and Session Establishment requests, an attacker can exploit the "signaling budget" of a shared AMF. If the AMF is configured to provide a guaranteed number of transactions per second (TPS) per slice, an attacker can fill the IoT slice's quota to 99% and then launch small, bursts of traffic that exceed the limit. If the AMF's overload control logic is poorly implemented, it may throttle the entire AMF instance, including the critical URLLC slice, to prevent a total crash.

B. User Plane Jitter Injection

In the Radio Access Network, an attacker can use coordinated "Preamble Interference" or "Resource Grid Flooding" to inject precisely timed noise during the PRB allocation window of a target slice. While the target slice's traffic may still get through, the resulting jitter can break the sub-millisecond requirements of industrial control loops, effectively disabling the service without technically "disconnecting" it.

RED TEAM INSIGHT

STRATEGIC SLA DEGRADATION

Adversaries targeting industrial 5G deployments often prefer subtle SLA degradation over total outages. A total outage triggers immediate incident response; a 5% increase in jitter or a 2% increase in packet loss can be attributed to "environmental interference" while still being enough to cause industrial robots to enter safety-stop modes, leading to massive financial loss without a clear security trigger.

VI. Cryptographic Slice Boundaries: Secondary Authentication (NSSAA)

To provide true end-to-end security for enterprise customers, 5G introduces Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization (NSSAA). This is the "secondary lock" on the slice door.

A. Beyond Primary Authentication

While 5G-AKA provides the primary authentication between the UE and the MNO's core, NSSAA allows the UE to authenticate directly with the enterprise's own Identity Provider (IdP) for a specific slice. This uses EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) frames encapsulated within NAS signaling.

This means that even if the MNO's core network is compromised, or an attacker manages to clone a SIM card (which is already difficult in 5G), they still cannot access the enterprise-specific slice without the secondary cryptographic credentials managed by the enterprise itself.

B. Implementation Challenges

NSSAA adds significant complexity to the attachment flow. The UE must support the EAP method required by the slice (e.g., EAP-TLS with client certificates), and the AMF must act as an EAP authenticator, proxying requests to an External AAA server. Misconfigurations in the AAA proxy logic or timeouts in the EAP handshake can lead to "False Rejects," where legitimate users are denied access to their dedicated slice.

DEFENSE STRATEGY

NSSAA DEPLOYMENT BEST PRACTICES

For mission-critical enterprise slices, NSSAA should be considered mandatory: - **Use EAP-TLS:** Avoid weaker EAP methods; use certificate-based authentication for both the UE and the slice-specific AAA server. - **Dedicated AAA Infrastructure:** Enterprises should host their own AAA servers rather than relying on MNO-shared instances to maintain full control over the identity lifecycle. - **Monitoring NSSAA Failures:** High rates of EAP failure in a specific slice are a primary indicator of credential-stuffing or slice-impersonation attempts.

VII. Slice Security Testing Methodology

Validating slice isolation requires a structured testing approach across all three planes. TelcoSec recommends the following framework, which can be executed in a private LTE/5G lab:

NSSAI Spoofing Tests: Send Registration Requests with forged NSSAI values and measure the target slice AMF's resource consumption and error handling behavior.
Cross-Slice Signaling Injection: From an authorized position in one slice, attempt to reach NFs in adjacent slices via the SBA HTTP/2 fabric. Verify that NRF authorization tokens properly restrict cross-slice NF discovery.
Kubernetes Namespace Escape: Attempt container breakout from a low-privilege slice pod and verify that podAntiAffinity rules prevent co-scheduling with critical slice workloads.
RAN Resource Exhaustion: Simulate traffic bursts in an eMBB slice and measure PRB availability degradation in URLLC slices under Soft vs. Hard slicing configurations.
Transport Isolation Verification: Confirm that VLAN/VxLAN segmentation prevents packet capture between slice transport segments, and that SDN flow rules cannot be manipulated to bridge segments.

For telecom pentesting methodology methodologies applicable to slice isolation audits, see our dedicated research.

VI. Authoritative References

01 3GPP TS 33.501Security Architecture and Procedures for 5G System3GPP TS 33.501 – 5G Security Architecture →
02 ENISA 5G CybersecuritySecurity in 5G Network SlicingREAD ENISA REPORT →
03 GSMA FS.36Network Slicing Security BaselineGSMA Security Resources & Guidelines →
04 3GPP TS 23.501System Architecture for the 5G System (Stage 2)3GPP TS 23.501 – 5G System Architecture →
05 NIST CSWP 36Applying 5G Cybersecurity and Privacy CapabilitiesREAD NIST GUIDANCE →
06 3GPP TS 29.531NSSF Services (Network Slice Selection)3GPP TS 29.531 – Network Slice Selection →

VII. Frequently Asked Questions

Can one slice access the IP data traversing another slice? ▼

Logically, no. Every slice maintains distinct routing tables and UPF instances. However, if an attacker compromises the underlying Kubernetes host running the UPF containers, or compromises the SDN controller managing the transport network, they could bridge the slice boundary and perform packet capture. Hardware anti-affinity and strict Kubernetes security contexts are the primary defenses.

Who manages the security of an enterprise slice? ▼

This is a shared responsibility model. The Mobile Network Operator (MNO) secures the physical infrastructure, CNF hypervisors, and shared control plane (AMF/NSSF). The enterprise customer is responsible for the application-layer security inside the slice and managing the Network Slice-Specific Authentication (NSSAA) identity provider. This mirrors the cloud shared responsibility model (AWS/Azure/GCP).

Is Hard Slicing always necessary? ▼

For critical URLLC services (autonomous vehicles, remote surgery), yes — Hard Slicing is mandatory to guarantee resource availability. For eMBB and MIoT slices where brief degradation is acceptable, Soft Slicing or Hybrid approaches provide better spectrum efficiency at acceptable risk levels. The table in Section II provides a detailed comparison.

How does Diameter-era roaming interact with 5G slicing? ▼

During the 4G/5G interworking period, Diameter signaling continues to traverse roaming interconnects. Because legacy 4G networks don't understand NSSAI, interworking functions must translate between legacy bearer management and slice-aware PDU sessions. This translation point is an additional attack surface — see our Diameter security analysis for specific AVP-level risks.

Can IMSI catchers target specific network slices? ▼

Not directly — IMSI catchers operate at the radio level before slice selection occurs. However, by capturing the Requested NSSAI from the UE's Registration Request (sent in cleartext), an IMSI catcher can determine which slice a subscriber is using, which has intelligence value for identifying high-value targets on enterprise or government slices.

What happens to slice isolation during network congestion? ▼

During severe congestion, operators may invoke network-level overload controls (NF Load Balancing, NF overload control per 3GPP TS 23.501). If these controls are not slice-aware, they can inadvertently degrade critical slices to protect overall network stability. This is why slice-specific resource reservation and SCP-level rate limiting are essential — they ensure congestion response is proportional per slice.

Conclusion & Next Steps

Network slicing offers tremendous operational and commercial advantages, but the marketing promise of "absolute isolation" masks deep technical complexities. A compromised device in an IoT slice can generate signaling storms that disable critical URLLC infrastructure slices unless strict, multi-plane isolation constraints are enforced at the RAN, Core, and Infrastructure layers simultaneously.

The defense roadmap for operators deploying network slicing:

Immediate: Implement Kubernetes anti-affinity and NetworkPolicy for all slice namespaces
Short-term: Deploy Hard Slicing for all URLLC/critical enterprise slices
Medium-term: Enable NSSAA for enterprise slice tenants; implement SCP-level per-slice rate limiting
Long-term: Continuous validation through telecom pentesting methodology and automated slice isolation monitoring

TelcoSec conducts in-depth security architecture reviews for 5G Standalone deployments, analyzing Kubernetes scheduling, NRF authorization policies, and slice routing isolation. Explore our TelcoSec research library for related 5G intelligence, or build a test lab for hands-on validation.

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INITIATE PROTOCOL VIEW CAPABILITIES

TECHNICAL GUIDE: 5G Slicing Isolation Auditing

The Isolation Paradox

No resource limits → can starve adjacent pods

No readOnlyRootFilesystem → writable container for persistence

Missing: nodeSelector, podAntiAffinity

Result: K8s scheduler may place on same node as URLLC UPF">

SLICE RESOURCE CONTENTION ATTACK

Amplification: Send from 10,000 rogue UEs → URLLC AMF resource exhaustion">

Unauthenticated Signaling Exposure

UNAUTHENTICATED SIGNALING ATTACK SURFACE

INFRASTRUCTURE ISOLATION HARDENING

STRATEGIC SLA DEGRADATION

NSSAA DEPLOYMENT BEST PRACTICES

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